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ARTICLES 
The stakes of  (not) knowing 
Motherhood, disability, and prenatal diagnosis in Jordan 
Christine Sargent 
Abstract  
This article draws on the concept of subjunctivity to explore how conditions of uncertainty, 
experimentation, and refusal shape the lives of women raising children with Down syndrome 
in Amman, Jordan. The connections that women forge – as mothers of children with Down 
syndrome – enable them to imagine new possibilities for their families and their futures across 
boundaries of class and circumstance. Prenatal diagnosis, however, invites possibilities of a 
different kind, challenging established models for divine creation, human agency, and moral 
accountability. As women reflect on what they would have done if they had known about their 
child’s Down syndrome in utero, they reason themselves to different conclusions. Yet their 
interest in the question itself reveals how, even in its absence, prenatal diagnosis circulates as 
a technology of subjunctivity, conjuring multiple possible pasts, presents, and futures. 
Keywords  
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Introduction 
On any given day, a steady stream of women and children trickled in and out of the Al-Nur 
Society, an organization promoting disability rights and awareness in Amman, Jordan.1 
 
1  All organizations and individuals described in my research have been provided with pseudonyms. 
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Families find Al-Nur and other organizations like it at different points in their lives. While 
many mothers (and occasionally fathers) arrived with a newborn in arms, others might enter 
with a toddler, a teenager, or a grown child beside them, just starting to connect with the 
disability networks growing across Jordan’s capital and, to a lesser extent, beyond it.  
Over the course of my research on care and Down syndrome, prenatal diagnostics emerged 
as a frequent topic of conversation among mothers. In most cases, they focused on a 
distinctive element of their shared experience: none of these women received a prenatal 
diagnosis of Down syndrome.2 In fact, none of them received any kind of prenatal indicator, 
let alone confirmation, of fetal difference. This pattern remained consistent within my own 
purposive sample, despite the widespread availability and accessibility of prenatal healthcare 
across the country. Whether in the Al-Nur Society’s reception room, which functioned as both 
a waiting area and social hub; during the public lectures and celebrations I attended across the 
capital; or in the interviews I conducted with women and family members between 2013 and 
2015, prenatal diagnostics emerged as a subjunctive presence. Sometimes raised explicitly and 
other times left implicit, a hypothetical question haunted many of these discussions. ‘What 
would I have done’, women wondered to themselves, to each other, and to me, ‘if I had 
known?’  
In this article, I use the concept of subjunctivity to highlight how uncertainty, experimentation, 
and refusal shaped the lives of women raising children with Down syndrome in Amman. The 
subjunctive ‘designat[es] or relat[es] to a verbal mood that refers to an action or state as 
conceived (rather than as a fact) and is therefore used chiefly to express a wish, command, 
exhortation, or a contingent, hypothetical, or prospective event’ (Oxford English Dictionary 2020, my 
emphasis). Anthropologists have built on this grammatical category to call attention to the 
subjunctive, as a ‘mood of doubt, hope, will, and potential’ that becomes especially salient in 
moments of failing health, illness, or disaster (Whyte 2002, 175; Samuels 2015; Wolf-Meyer 
and Callahan-Kapoor 2017). Bringing this framework to bear on my ethnographic data, I 
describe how the birth of a child with Down syndrome introduced profound uncertainties 
into the lives of the women I met, while also exposing them to new possibilities for community 
and knowledge. These uncertainties embedded themselves in daily routines and relationships, 
as Down syndrome in Jordan unsettles taken-for-granted models of human development and 
adult personhood. Yet despite women’s daily struggles to care for their children (or, perhaps, 
 
2  In the context of this article, I use the term ‘prenatal diagnosis’ to encompass screening and 
diagnostic procedures.  
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precisely because of them), the ways that prenatal diagnostics intersect with subjunctivities of 
fate, choice, faith, and family generated considerable debate and concern. 
In the next two sections, I present an overview of local perceptions of Down syndrome in 
Jordan, outlining the family and social circumstances that shape how mothers assumed care 
and advocacy labors on behalf of their children. Enduring disability stigma, uneven legislative 
protections, and a service sector stratified by class and capital informed the dilemmas raised 
by prenatal diagnostics, while also speaking to broader conditions of subjunctivity that 
parenting a child with Down syndrome introduced into women’s lives. I then connect current 
interdisciplinary conversations on prenatal diagnostics and selective reproductive technologies 
to the specific legal, ethical, and ethnographic realities that women in Jordan confront. Turning 
to my data, I juxtapose my conversations with two mothers of children with Down syndrome 
who, in reflecting on the lack of prenatal diagnosis in their own lives, reasoned themselves to 
ostensibly opposite conclusions about the morality of knowing. Both women ultimately shared 
the same stance on selective abortion, which they considered to be undeniably linked to the 
pursuit of diagnosis and also deeply objectionable. They differed, however, on the legitimacy 
of acquiring prenatal diagnostic knowledge itself.  
Subjunctivity allows me to highlight how the women in my research constructed themselves 
as fallible moral agents and considered diagnostic knowledge as deeply embedded in 
relationships with God and with kin. While the contested status of fetal personhood has 
dominated North American debates on prenatal diagnostics and selective reproduction 
(Christoffersen-Deb 2012; Conklin and Morgan 1996; Howes-Mischel 2016; Kaufman and 
Morgan 2005), relational obligations and forms of accountability emerged as more significant 
in the conversations I observed. Here, I join other anthropologists interested in exploring how 
politics and practices of selective reproduction – built through clinical interactions, national 
biopolitical agendas, transnational reproductive health rights frameworks, and in everyday life 
– are mediated by memories of colonialism, development, war, and occupation (Gammeltoft 
2007, 2013; Ivry 2006; Kanaaneh 2002). The mothers I met located themselves in an 
expanding technological system that abstractly exemplifies ideals of medical and scientific 
progress while practically posing serious challenges to established models for divine creation, 
human agency, and moral accountability. The selective implications of prenatal diagnosis 
perturbed them, even while they struggled to secure their children’s basic rights: access to 
education, transportation, work, and social futures. Nevertheless, in their divergent reflections 
on what might have been, should have been, and could come to be, these women relied on 
the very technologies of subjunctivity that they worked to mitigate and contain in different 
ways. 
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From shock to acceptance 
In coming to terms with an unexpected postnatal diagnosis of Down syndrome, most women 
spoke of the initial months or years after the birth of their child as a period of sadma (shock).3 
The marital and familial discord that can arise during this time certainly contributed to this 
shock. Many families weathered the tumult of this process while managing to avoid its most 
destructive or protracted possible conclusions. The fact that I met most of my interlocutors 
as they pursued services for their child or attended public celebrations and awareness-raising 
events speaks to the support they received from immediate and extended family, albeit to 
varying degrees. They did not, then, represent the most vulnerable of cases. Everyone, 
however, knew women and disabled children facing precarious circumstances, which ranged 
from spousal conflict and abandonment to child neglect and abuse; particularly egregious cases 
emerge from time to time in both Arabic and English newspaper and media coverage. The 
families represented in my research, however, considered themselves fortunately protected 
from and actively working against this wider and more violent spectrum of experiences that 
shape Jordan’s contemporary disability world (Ginsburg and Rapp 2013). 
Whether acquired immediately at birth or after some time, a postnatal diagnosis of Down 
syndrome occasioned grief and anxiety for many mothers, couples, and families. In addition 
to not receiving the diagnosis prenatally, several women shared with me that they were not 
directly informed about their child’s Down syndrome. Diagnosis was sometimes withheld 
from both parents, or the physician might choose to first communicate the situation to a 
woman’s husband or kin. Nevertheless, mothers also spoke of their own intuition that 
something unexpected had transpired, gathering clues from the long pauses of medical staff, 
the unexpected arrival of family members at the hospital, or perhaps a fleeting thought that 
their baby looked slightly different in a vaguely familiar way. The stress and fear that 
accompany giving birth to a sick baby – health complications among newborns with Down 
syndrome are common – also created intense emotional and financial struggles that 
exacerbated sadma.  
On a deeper level, the diagnosis of Down syndrome compelled parents to confront the 
normative expectations they nurtured, even if unconsciously, for their anticipated child. 
Parents of disabled children are by no means alone in confronting gaps between the 
 
3  In this piece, I use a simplified version of the International Journal for Middle East Studies 
Transliteration System. I have omitted diacritics, with the exception of ’ for hamza and ‘ for ayn. 
Transliterations of direct speech are meant to approximate the majority of my interlocutors’ urban, 
Palestinian/Jordan dialect(s), although I have preserved some Modern Standard Arabic forms, 
such as Umm (mother), which is often pronounced ‘Imm’. 
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expectations and realities that their children embody, but congenital and early childhood 
disability seems to hasten and amplify the emotional intensity of these speculative exercises 
(Landsman 1998; Parens and Asch 1999; Rapp 1999). Ultimately, however, lingering in a state 
of shock was considered unacceptable. Some women became quite critical of sadma, 
reinterpreting this reaction as both evidence of internalized stigma against disability and 
momentarily lapsed faith in God. Regardless of its morally ambiguous implications, however, 
the lived intensity of sadma guided interactions between experienced mothers, specialists, and 
women still grappling with diagnosis, the latter being treated with a mixture of caution and 
empathy.  
Women who no longer felt the burdens of sadma offered their own ‘beginning’ stories as they 
became less emotionally raw with the passing of time. Doing so served as means for cultivating 
rapport with overwhelmed peers and for establishing their experiential authority in mothering 
children with Down syndrome (see Landsman 1998 and Thomas 2014 for parallel narrative 
transitions). This process – one they often described in terms of developing acceptance – was 
marked in part by the linguistic embrace of Down syndrome. Literally translated as mutilazamat 
Down, and also described simply as ‘Down’ or ‘Down syndrome’, these terms coexist with that 
of mongholi, which remains a popular colloquial description of Down syndrome in Jordan. Most 
of my interlocutors considered mongholi an inappropriate ethno-racial slur and a cruel synonym 
for stupid, and public awareness campaigns against the use of mongholi took place throughout 
my fieldwork via Facebook, on public television programs, and through community and 
everyday engagement.4 The term also gestures to the entangled global history of Down 
syndrome and medical scientific racism; John Langdon Down himself introduced the label of 
‘mongoloid idiocy’ to describe the individuals he studied at the Royal Earlswood Asylum for 
 
4  In this article, I consider Down syndrome a cognitive or intellectual disability, following arguments 
made by Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson (2010) and taken up by Patrick McKearney and Tyler 
Zoanni (2018), as well as language guidelines from the National Down Syndrome Society (2015). 
Article Three of Jordan’s Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (No. 20 of the year 2017) 
uses the term dhihiniyya, which is translated as ‘intellectual’ in the English document (Higher 
Council), in its definition of disability (‘iaqa). ‘Intellectual’ is followed by the term ‘mental’; the 
latter does not directly correspond to the five Arabic categories of impairment (jasadiyya, hassiya, 
dhihiniyya, nafsiyya, ‘asabiyya), which are expanded into six English equivalents (physical, sensory, 
intellectual, mental, psychological or neurological). A video by the King Hussein Foundation 
(2018) exclusively uses the term dhihiniyya, which is the language used by the Higher Council for 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in its publications and social media. During my research, 
people often described Down Syndrome with the term ‘aqliyya, which can also be translated as 
‘intellectual’ but may more closely approximate ‘mental’ in English. The rich sociolinguistic and 
philosophical terrains that involve these and other relevant terms – and issues of translation– are 
beyond the scope of this piece. 
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Idiots in Surrey, England, during the late nineteenth century (Chen 2016; Thomas 2017). The 
term mongholi does not appear to have circulated in the region during Ottoman times, when, 
according to disability historian Sara Scalenghe, people with Down syndrome would likely 
have fallen under the label of idiocy (‘ataha) or the broader category of blights (ʿahat) 
(Scalenghe 2014, 3, 89).  
In person, on social media, through group chats, and even in public spaces like restaurants 
and malls, mothers navigated between the twin poles of normal and exceptional, debating 
precisely the difference(s) that Down syndrome makes.5 With concerns ranging from 
discipline to toilet training, sibling rivalry to table manners, they alternated between urging 
each other to treat a child with Down syndrome ‘just like any other child’ and taking seriously 
a spectrum of bodily and cognitive differences that could require an alternative approach to 
reach a goal or meet a milestone. Rayna Rapp (1999, 293) has described these tensions as 
‘doubled discourses… of sameness and difference’, whereby individuals with Down syndrome 
are coded as exceptional and average, normal and different, a blessing and a burden. Yet, 
beyond the realm of discourse, these conversations also reflect the shifting and contingent 
ways that children and adults enact and embody Down syndrome through social, therapeutic, 
educational, and familial relationships that change over time.  
The perils and possibilities of living subjunctively 
Mothers’ experiences of sadma, while dark and difficult, allowed them to connect and 
communicate experiences across the divides of class and ethnicity that structure everyday life 
in Amman (Beal 2000; Sukarieh 2016; Tobin 2012). Popular and scholarly descriptions 
describe a stark division of Jordan’s capital city, which houses over 40 percent of the country’s 
nine-and-a-half million residents (Department of Statistics 2015). East Amman, the much 
larger ‘half’, covers the densely populated eastern and central districts and is home to several 
Palestinian refugee camps that are now permanent settlements (Ababsa 2013). West Amman, 
in turn, houses the country’s major political institutions and is marked by its villas, high-end 
shopping malls catering to international clientele, and luxury hotel brands like the Four 
Seasons. While residents of East Amman increasingly find themselves working in the booming 
service sectors that cater to local and foreign elite residents who reside and spend time in the 
west (Schwedler 2010), these parts of the city remain less familiar and more uncomfortable, as 
well as prohibitively expensive. As a friend once commented while driving me from her home 
 
5  This phrase draws from and modifies the title of Rod Michalko’s (2002) The Difference That Disability 
Makes. 
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in East Amman to my apartment near the touristic Rainbow Street, ‘You know this part of the 
city much better than I would.’  
For many women, the possibility of forging connections through mothering a child with 
Down syndrome required them to navigate the social and geographical boundaries of east and 
west, let alone those between capital and the ‘other’ Governorates. This process generated 
tentativeness, doubt, and subjunctivity. Anthropologists of healing, language, and narrative 
have explored the significant role that subjunctivity plays in structuring human experience in 
general and illness in particular, focusing on the ways that narrative subjunctivity enables 
individuals to sustain open and flexible relations with alternative pasts and futures (Bruner 
1986; Good 1994; Good et al. 1994). Beyond narrative, however, Susan Reynolds Whyte 
(2002, 175) argues that ‘where people are negotiating uncertainty and possibility, subjunctivity 
is an aspect of subjectivity’. She describes how her interlocutors, living through the AIDS crisis 
in Uganda, strategically assessed and nurtured relationships with various others while living 
through conditions of attenuated subjunctivity. I extend her observations here to highlight 
how Down syndrome perceptibly remade women’s relationships to each other and to the city 
of Amman itself.  
Through their efforts to gather information and seek services, women created relationships 
with hitherto unimaginable allies and in places they would never have otherwise set out to 
find. I once spent several hours listening to an utterly lost and very stressed mother repeatedly 
call the staff at Al-Nur as she attempted to figure out the building’s location. While the city’s 
large traffic circles, or duwwars, provide common reference points for reaching unknown 
destinations, the nearest duwwar unfortunately went by multiple names. She arrived nearly two 
hours late and more than a little exhausted. The mysteries and mundane drudgery of 
(un)successfully navigating traffic often became a visible testament of maternal commitment, 
not to mention bonding material for the foreign anthropologist who was constantly lost or 
almost lost. In another instance, I accompanied a group of upper-class mothers making home 
visits to families in one of East Amman’s poorest neighborhoods during the month of 
Ramadan. At one of our final stops, as we stood in a threadbare apartment with almost no 
furnishings, our visibly worn-down host hesitantly inquired whether it was really possible that 
my guide was also the mother of a disabled child. She seemed utterly astonished that they 
would share this bond, while my guide was equally as amazed by her astonishment.  
In the midst of this fellowship, the tangible and concrete impacts of inequality laid bare 
women’s differential access to money, services, and time. What would their own capacities to 
care be like, wondered my poorer interlocutors and those displaced by war and regional 
conflict, if they had the money to hire a foreign domestic worker, as is custom among members 
of the elite and upper-middle classes? What would have happened, they asked, if they had the 
money and knowledge to begin early intervention and specialized therapies right away, rather 
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than two or three years after receiving their child’s diagnosis? In other words, in and through 
each other, women came to envision new possibilities, but also to appreciate the constraints 
that shaped their individual circumstances and those of their children. The ostensible 
universality of Down syndrome was always held in visible tension with the impacts of immense 
social inequalities that expanded to include those between the Global North and South, as 
made apparent through Facebook, YouTube, and other online social platforms. These 
engagements with others, and the hypotheticals they inspired, nevertheless unfold within the 
emergent framework of what Faye Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (2013) have described as 
‘disability worlds’, which incorporate disability as a central tenet of human experience and 
mode of culture-building.  
Prenatal diagnostics, however, invite hypotheticals of an entirely different kind. Their ability 
to unmake the disability worlds that, in Jordan and elsewhere, remain deeply grounded in 
cosmologies of kinship (Gammeltoft 2008) raised the moral stakes of these interventions. 
Existing work on subjunctivity has focused on the ‘tactics’ through which chronically ill 
persons and members of their social networks preserve the possibility of future intervention 
by cure or miracle (Good et al. 1994, 837). These individually and collectively forged narratives 
provide the means not only for making sense of the world but also for intersubjectively making 
social worlds, especially in the presence of sickness or suffering (Bruner 1990; Garro and 
Mattingly 2000; Ochs and Capps 2001). In her research on HIV, family, and moral conflict in 
Aceh, Indonesia, for example, Annemarie Samuels (2018, 99) writes that her interlocutor 
Tabinda ‘actively fosters the subjunctive elements of her narrative by leaving future trajectories 
open rather than clearly thinking through different possibilities’. Tabinda’s vague and flexible 
commitment to sustaining multiple possible futures, Samuels argues, allows her to 
continuously make and remake her world in the face of challenging circumstances. Ambiguity, 
deferral, and indeterminacy encompass ways of subjunctively engaging the world while 
juggling competing moral demands and the ethical dilemmas they engender (Zigon 2014).  
Many of the women I spoke with closely associated the ambiguity and indeterminacy of 
prenatal diagnostics with risk and harm. They felt that nothing good could come from 
receiving knowledge of a fetus’s Down syndrome. Whether an individual privately considered 
their own lack of prenatal diagnosis a blessing or an injustice, women on both sides of this 
divide seemed to agree that prenatal diagnosis caused suffering, either by enabling one to know 
something that they might not be able to change or by enabling one to change something that 
they perhaps should not be able to know about in the first place. The advent and possible 
routinization of prenatal diagnostic technologies, however, produce increasingly inescapable 
conditions of subjunctivity. My interlocutors, in turn, attempted to manage these 
compromising circumstances by interrogating the value of (not) knowing, demonstrating the 
contested and suggestive moral ambiguities that attach to certain kinds of knowledge. 
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Technologies of subjectivity: Negotiating selective reproductive 
technologies in the Middle East 
In the flow of everyday life, women overwhelmingly connected prenatal diagnosis with 
selective abortion, which they widely described as religiously impermissible (haram) regardless 
of a fetus’s condition – unless the mother’s life was in danger or fetal death imminent. While 
prenatal diagnosis does not inevitably lead to termination, the intimate connection between 
the two reflects what a German obstetrician once described to anthropologist Susan Erikson 
as the ‘strange and very special’ nature of the technology; it ‘is the only routine scan in all of 
medicine for which the only treatment is death’ (Erikson 2007, 209). In a recent Knowledge, 
Attitudes, and Practices survey on prenatal genetic testing in Jordan, less than 30 percent of 
the more than 1,000 women surveyed responded that they would consider seeking an abortion 
if provided with a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome, citing religious and ethical reasons 
(Abdo et al. 2018, 10-11). Yet this result itself relies primarily on subjunctive reasoning, as the 
authors themselves acknowledge; just 15 percent of survey respondents had a close relative 
with a congenital disability and certainly even fewer were personally connected to a child with 
a congenital disability. The mothers of children with Down syndrome whom I spoke with 
were highly skeptical that prenatal diagnosis could be extricated from the logic of selective 
reproduction, although some did in fact hold this separation as key to their moral justification 
for knowing.  
Ethnographers of the Arabic-speaking Middle East have focused on the advent of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs) in the region, documenting the burdens of infertility and 
the moral and legal complexities that arise in Muslim communities, where determining 
legitimacy and protecting norms of relatedness remain paramount concerns (Clarke 2009; 
Inhorn 2003, 2015). Global scholarship on ARTs follows how racial and ethnic logics, 
pronatalist state policies, and patriarchal kinship ideologies inform and propel prospective 
parents in their ‘quests for conception’ (Storrow 2005; Inhorn 1994; Roberts 2012; see 
Nahman 2016 on ‘reproscapes’).6 Regionally, however, a form of academic pronatalism seems 
to mirror popular discourse, minimizing inquiry into the ways that perceptions of normality 
and desirability may limit or derail couples’ reproductive aspirations.7 Researchers examining 
 
6  The rapid uptake of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) over the past seven years has generated 
a more extensive and targeted discussion on prenatal screening, diagnostics, and disability 
(Agarwal et al. 2013; Minear et al. 2015; Ravitsky 2017). 
7  Unlike the rest of the region, research in Israel closely examines the intersections of race, ethnicity, 
and undesirability in the consumption of ARTs (Birenbaum-Carmeli et al. 2002; Kahn 2000; 
Nahman 2006; see Weiss 1994 on Israeli parents’ reactions to postnatally diagnosed disabilities). 
Mandatory and optional premarital screening programs for inherited blood disorders, particularly 
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the impacts of selective reproductive technologies, especially those working in South and 
Southeast Asia, have closely followed the ethical and demographic consequences of sex 
selection, a practice usually employed to enact son preference (Croll 2000; Miller 2001; Patel 
2007; Whittaker 2010, 2011). While the looming possibility of ‘gendercide’ (Warren 1985) has 
raised considerable offense in the liberal imagination, the impact of selective reproduction on 
disability generates considerably more ambivalence (Asch 2001; Parens and Asch 1999; Wong 
2002). When fetal impairments are discovered in utero, whether via screening or diagnostics, 
selective termination is often framed as the best or even the only solution – at least in North 
American contexts (Kafer 2013; Wong 2002).  
While Jordanian women experience pregnancy as thoroughly medicalized, punctuated by 
doctors’ appointments, ultrasounds, blood tests, and surveillance, it nevertheless remains 
unevenly biomedicalized; the availability and implementation of new medical technologies are 
inconsistent.8 Cost may pose a significant hurdle; as of 2013, private insurance companies did 
not cover a second trimester ultrasound (Thekrallah et al. 2013, 76). For women covered by 
public insurance, limited availability of equipment and high demand present a similar hurdle 
(ibid.). According to the 2017–2018 Population and Family Health Survey, 98 percent of 
women in Jordan received prenatal care from a medical professional, and this same percentage 
gave birth in a medical facility during the previous five years (Department of Statistics and ICF 
2019, 143). Over the course of pregnancy, 82 percent of Jordanian women made seven or 
more antenatal care visits during this time, although this number fell to 74 percent among 
‘other nationalities’ and dropped to 62 percent among Syrian women (ibid., 145). The Survey 
reports nearly universal coverage for ‘key antenatal services’, which include blood pressure 
measurements, urine samples, blood samples, and weight measurements, but it does not 
specify beyond this (ibid.). In her research on childbirth in Jordan, Irene Maffi (2012, 140) 
described significant discrepancies between the procedures and tests available in private 
practices, which were usually offered on a monthly basis, and those available in public and 
NGO-based clinics. Furthermore, even when prenatal diagnostic tests are available, doctors 
may avoid promoting them, as Tsipy Ivry (2006) has shown in the case of Japan. My 
interlocutors routinely engaged with biomedical institutions during their pregnancy and thus 
expressed surprise that doctors did not ‘catch’ their child’s Down syndrome beforehand. Some 
women specifically mentioned ultrasounds or lab work as part of their antenatal care routine, 
 
thalassemia, have been implemented across several Middle Eastern countries (Beaudevin 2013; 
Saffi and Howard 2015), but carrier screening can only be effective for certain conditions. 
8  For example, while the World Health Organization’s range for safe C-section rates falls between 
5 to 15 percent, Jordan’s stands at 28 percent (Department of Statistics and ICF 2019), a level 
comparable to the United States’ own elevated rate of 31.9 percent (Martin et al. 2018). 
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while others made vague references to the presence of medical experts without specifying tests 
or technologies.  
Legal structures and moral norms shape the very realms of possibility that prenatal diagnostics 
are capable of conjuring. Abortion in Jordan is regulated by Article 12 of the Public Health 
Act, Law No. 47 of 2008, and Article 21 of the Medical Constitution, both of which recognize 
danger to the mother’s health as legitimate grounds for termination (Ministry of Health n.d.; 
Nimri 2016). According to United Nations sources, fetal impairment was added to the list of 
existing criteria in 2005, and the termination of a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest 
became legal in 2015 (UN DESA n.d.). More recent English and Arabic language publications, 
however, disagree with this account, maintaining that abortion can only be performed if the 
mother’s life is in danger (Abdo et al. 2018; Nimri 2019). Contradictory interpretations and 
variable public perceptions reflect ongoing legal debates and the impact of contemporary 
fatwas, or legally non-binding edicts issued by religious scholars. Fatwas carry notable moral 
authority and are meant to guide and inform the spirit of the law.9  
The field of Islamic bioethics encompasses a wider range of stances on the permissibility of 
abortion than the national laws operating across the Middle East and North Africa region, 
reflecting the dynamic reasoning that religious scholars employ as they weigh the benefits and 
risks of new medical technologies. Different understandings of the process of ensoulment – 
recognized as occurring at either forty, ninety, or 120 days after conception – are key to these 
discussions (Hessini 2007; Rispler-Chaim 2007). Historically, ‘for abortion before 120 days, 
various opinions have been expressed which can be summed up into three or four main 
contentions, viz., unconditionally permissible, permissible in case of having an excuse (‘udhr), 
and generally reprehensible and forbidden’ (Ghaly 2008, 116). Scholars today largely conform 
to these positions, but they must address questions raised by the expansion of prenatal 
diagnostics. Deliberations focus on the stage of pregnancy at which termination can occur and 
the kinds of impairments that justify this outcome, as guided by principles of mercy, suffering, 
and social protection for the mother and family (Ghaly 2008).  
As early as 1993, for example, Jordan’s Council of Ifta’ ruled it permissible to terminate a fetus 
prior to four months of gestation, with both parent’s consent, if doctors determined that it 
suffered from an impairment that would ‘make its life unstable’ (Al-Ifta’ [1993] 2015). 
Medicalization of the fetus – and of disability by extension – plays an increasing role in these 
arguments across the Middle East and North Africa. Jess Marie Newman (2018), for example, 
 
9  In the case of a pregnancy resulting from rape, Jordan’s Council of Ifta’ ruled in 2014 that it would 
assess requests for termination on a case-by-case basis (Al-Aifta’ 2014). 
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describes how fetal impairment has become a compelling ‘middle ground’ for Moroccan 
activists seeking to reduce existing restrictions on abortion, efforts that should not be equated 
with liberalizing access to abortion. While fatwas can influence both legal strictures and the 
moral deliberations of Muslims in daily life, they are not synonymous with law, nor do their 
subtleties always permeate the realms of popular discourse. Equally as important, ostensible 
legality does not equate to practical accessibility (Dabash and Roudi-Fahimi 2008). Shifting 
hospital policies and spousal consent laws mean that abortion formally unfolds as a collective 
decision belonging to medical practitioners, husbands, and extended family members in 
addition to pregnant women. Moreover, hospitals or individual doctors may follow policies 
that remain internal to their places of work. 
The accessibility and effects of selective reproductive technologies also depend on the gender 
and kinship structures that shape family planning, local political economies of healthcare, and 
moral economies of suffering. The families that Duana Fullwiley (2004) met during her 
research on sickle cell disease in Senegal, for example, drew on the temporally sensitive process 
of ensoulment to make space for selective abortion as distinct from the crime of ending a 
human life. Not all families viewed termination as ‘the barely hidden interlocutor of all prenatal 
testing’ (Rapp 1999, 129). Some felt that prenatal diagnosis could provide time to prepare for 
a sick child (Fullwiley 2004). Those who did connect prenatal testing with selective abortion 
pointed to religious distinctions between human-ness and non-human-ness and Islamic 
scholars’ concern for the burdens of disease and illness (ibid.). Both these perspectives, noted 
Fullwiley (2004), also depended on individuals’ lived experiences with sickle cell disease and 
whether they watched their children thrive in spite of their sickle cell status or suffer because 
of it. It is the swirling force of these different components, grounded in the ways that people 
make sense of circumstance and destiny, that informed women’s confrontations with these 
technologies of subjunctivity. 
It’s better not to know 
A week after the global event of World Down Syndrome Day, held every year on 21 March, I 
sat with Umm Kawthar10 comparing notes on the different events included in the 2015 
celebrations. During a panel on Down syndrome and medical issues, held at a large hospital 
 
10  Here I employ the teknonym formula of address and naming that my interlocutors used, known 
in Arabic as kunya. It consists of the parental category of Umm (mother) or Abu (father) + name 
of child. Traditionally, parents take the name of their firstborn child (and for some, their firstborn 
son, if and when a son is born). In everyday interactions, parents might assume the name of the 
child present with them or being discussed in conversation. In the interactional fields of my 
research, parents often assumed the name of their child with Down syndrome. 
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in Amman, a young woman stood up to ask the panel of health professionals a question. How 
was it possible, she wanted to know, that despite attending consistent appointments 
throughout her pregnancy, doctors never diagnosed her baby with Down syndrome. The panel 
equivocated and generally tried to sidestep providing a definitive response. I subsequently 
brought up this exchange with Umm Kawthar, as I was curious to hear her perspective on this 
moment and the many issues it raised. ‘It’s impossible’, she told me. ‘Aside from it being 
expensive, we cannot have these tests here because abortion is haram’.  
I countered her argument by pointing out that screening and diagnosis do not necessarily lead 
to abortion. They could, I reasoned, be used to better prepare families for the medical, 
emotional, and financial demands that raising a disabled child can entail. Umm Kawthar 
brushed this aside as nonsense and countered back: 
If a mother knows beforehand, even if she doesn’t abort, she will be so sick with worry 
– What will her husband say? How will the children find out? What will the neighbors 
say? – that she will not take care of herself properly… In America, it’s not very 
important what people say, but here it is very, very important. Through her anxiety, the 
mother may harm the fetus. Unless there is a danger to the mother, there shouldn’t be 
any knowledge beforehand. This is something up to God. God creates what exists in 
this world. 
In explaining her opposition to the prospect of prenatal diagnosis, Umm Kawthar raised three 
points. First and foremost, she connected prenatal diagnosis with selective abortion. Yet ‘even 
if’ a woman chose not to abort, the diagnosis itself could cause damage. The socially embodied 
and collective dynamics of pregnancy and reproduction became clear in Umm Kawthar’s 
response, which highlight the potential impacts of spouses, children, and neighbors on a 
pregnant woman’s wellbeing. The importance of these social relations – for both mother and 
fetus – were such that, given my outsider status, Umm Kawthar worried I could not possibly 
understand the full weight of their impact.  
Describing this damage, Umm Kawthar’s hypothetical situation focused on the potentially 
destructive words, thoughts, and actions of others, as well as the dangers a pregnant woman 
in distress can pose to herself. These forces were, in her opinion, more consequential and 
threatening than the actual diagnosis and its ramifications. Umm Kawthar was a woman of 
determination and steely grit, but receiving her now-toddler’s postnatal diagnosis had been an 
incredible shock. Beyond her very acute fears about family and community responses, the 
doctors’ grim and wildly aggressive prognostications about Kawthar’s allegedly profound 
impairment and impending early death left a deep mark on her younger self. One of the most 
consistent and radical claims she made to her peers and in more general audiences was that 
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Down syndrome, in so many ways, says very little about the individuals who live ‘under its 
description’ (Martin 2009).  
It was the contested moral status of prenatal diagnostics itself around which Umm Kawthar 
formed her third point, which ultimately returns to its debatably inevitable motivation of 
selective abortion. Acquiring diagnosis prenatally links knowledge to action in a way that 
violated the boundaries of human agency she considered acceptable. If ‘God creates what 
exists in the world’, prenatal diagnosis opens up the possibility of this being otherwise. 
Through diagnostic technologies, creation and its counterpart of selection are subjected to the 
whims of subjunctive human logic and reason, capacities widely regarded as incomplete and 
flawed. Apart from the morally contested act of terminating a fetus, diagnostics posed further 
harm by enabling the subjunctive narratives of others. Like the ambivalent possibilities made 
thinkable by testing, the ambivalent narratives produced by others posed direct risks to a 
pregnant woman’s health and wellbeing, and that of her family. ‘It’s very important what 
people say’ – and that is precisely what remains hard to predict, despite the considerable energy 
people spent attempting to do so. 
It was my right to know 
Umm Dunia did not agree that it was better not to know. She candidly described the shock of 
her daughter’s postnatal diagnosis to me in terms similar to many other mothers. Days after 
returning from the hospital, Dunia developed a bad cold, so an older sibling volunteered to 
take her back to the hospital. When they arrived, Umm Dunia explained, ‘the doctor took one 
look at Dunia and said she was mongholi’. Reeling from this public and abrupt announcement 
of their sister’s Down syndrome, Dunia’s sibling decided to try to keep the news from their 
mother until further tests could be run. They enlisted their father’s help to make appointments 
for Dunia at other local hospitals. Umm Dunia learned what was going on when one of her 
husband’s relatives called to ask whether she was ‘going crazy’ waiting to hear if her daughter 
was mongholi. When her children later informed her that they were taking Dunia to another 
appointment for her illness, Umm Dunia intervened. 
I said that they were all liars and they would do nothing of the sort. ‘She’s MY daughter. 
I’ll take her!’ We went to four different hospitals, and they all said the same thing: ‘Your 
daughter is mongholi’. At the last clinic, I was speaking with a young doctor. ‘Please don’t 
tell me Dunia is mongholi’, I said. The doctor responded that Dunia definitely was 
mongholi and that she would probably die as a baby. If not, she said that Dunia would 
live to be twenty-five at most, with a mental age of four. And death would be better.  
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Umm Dunia recounted this memory with a sad smile. She struggled after receiving Dunia’s 
diagnosis, crying, overwhelmed, and angry. ‘My husband was more accepting than I was’, she 
recalled with a small laugh. ‘He would tell me “Alhamdulillah [Thank God]. Some people have 
cerebral palsy, or autism! Alhamdulilllah”.’11  
I asked Umm Dunia if she wished she had known about the Down syndrome during her 
pregnancy. She paused and thought about the question. ‘I’m not sure, if I had found out 
beforehand. […] But it was my right to know’. Umm Dunia clearly felt that this information 
was wrongly withheld from her, although I was not sure whether she meant to imply that her 
doctor knew and did not tell her, or that he did not know but should have. ‘It would have 
been my decision’, she continued. ‘And I had a right to make it. I don’t know. Maybe I would 
have terminated, or maybe I would have feared God. But it was my right to know. Dunia’s 
birth was a cruel surprise; a mother is free [al-umm hiyya hurra].’ Umm Dunia clearly disagreed 
that it was better not to know, but she nevertheless shared many of the same key assumptions 
as her peers. The two options she presented, in the aftermath of knowing, were either 
terminating a pregnancy or ‘fearing God’, the latter being the morally superior alternative. She 
remained focused, however, on her own relationship to diagnostic knowledge and her own 
relationship with God. What mattered most was being given the chance to know and to 
choose. Concerned less with the question of whether or not one should know and more with 
the reality that people can and do know, she embraced the subjunctive possibilities engendered 
by prenatal diagnosis. The choice itself and the right to choose both emerge from the 
subjunctivity brought into being by these new diagnostic technologies.  
Umm Dunia was a fierce advocate for her daughter. Dunia had transformed her world, 
bringing her new burdens and responsibilities, but also new opportunities. She was a beloved 
family member and created new identities and perspectives for her parents and siblings. Yet, 
Umm Dunia was the first to admit that she was devastated by the ‘cruel surprise’ of her 
daughter’s diagnosis. She talked about the stigma she and her family encountered, stigma that 
she too had perpetuated before her own daughter was born with Down syndrome only a few 
years ago. The process of caring for her daughter launched Umm Dunia into an unexpected – 
and initially undesired – project of moral becoming, to paraphrase anthropologist Cheryl 
Mattingly (2014). And yet, the question remained: what would she have done, if she had 
 
11  Throughout my research, I often encountered strong everyday typologies of disability, with certain 
features and characteristics linked to specific diagnostic labels. Comparisons between Down 
syndrome and autism were not infrequent, and many families saw Down syndrome as a foil for 
autism, linking the latter to stereotypes of violent and antisocial behavior.  
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known? Well aware of the problematic choices that knowing would enable, Umm Dunia 
desired access to them nonetheless; ‘a mother is free’.  
Conclusion 
In this article, I use the concept of subjunctivity to draw attention to the ways that uncertainty 
infiltrates the pasts, presents, and futures of mothers raising children with Down syndrome in 
Amman. Their concern and speculation over forms of prenatal diagnosis reveals how 
subjunctivity itself can develop into an object of social discourse and evaluation. It also reveals 
how, at least from the perspective of the mothers I met during my research, prenatal screening 
and diagnostics cannot be separated from the issue of selective reproduction. Many of these 
women shared the perspective that pursuing testing beyond that of basic health information 
(a standard open to debate) indicated a lack of faith in God and an inability to recognize the 
proper limits of human agency. Embracing their children, prenatal diagnostics challenged their 
identities as good mothers. Accepting or longing for testing felt tantamount to rejecting Down 
syndrome and, by extension, rejecting their own child. To suggest as much runs counter to 
widespread ideals of maternal and feminine subjectivity, and to articulate this desire would be 
particularly painful for women who expended considerable time and energy attempting to 
make space for their children in a world that remains hostile to disability.  
Some of my participants supported Umm Kawthar’s position, asserting not only that it was 
better not to know but also that one should not know. The technological refusal advocated by 
Umm Kawthar places the destinies of kinship and disability beyond the subjunctive realms of 
‘what-if’ that prenatal diagnostics bring into being. Others, however, disagreed. For Umm 
Dunia, conflicting moral principles came into view. While she worried about making the right 
choice, it was equally important to her that she be given the choice to make. Prenatal diagnosis 
is creating new possibilities and expectations for pregnancy in Jordan. One of my interlocutors, 
for example, told me she would leave the country to pursue testing for any subsequent 
pregnancies after her child was born with Down syndrome. For these women, new 
technologies surface competing expectations – to know their bodies, to embrace biomedicine, 
to protect their (unborn) children, and to carefully navigate the kinship structures and 
relationships that render reproduction as anything but autonomous.  
Even when they remain underused, whether by choice or due to structural constraints, prenatal 
diagnostics work as technologies of subjunctivity. They become part of how women in Jordan, 
as elsewhere, construct themselves as responsible women, as good mothers, and as moral 
persons. Prenatal diagnostics are by no means the only arena in which mothers of children 
with Down syndrome confront uncertainty and wrestle with hypotheticals. Will they be able 
to find a school that welcomes their child? How will their son or daughter make a living and 
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a life when they are grown but lack access to support systems outside the family? What will 
happen when – inevitably – parents can no longer provide care? The future-oriented anxieties 
that swirled around my participants were not necessarily different in kind from general parental 
anxieties, but they intensified in degree. And the very relationships that women formed to 
navigate the world as the mother of a child with Down syndrome in turn amplified their 
musings about ‘what-if’ and ‘what-when.’ My interlocutors found themselves navigating 
rapidly changing narratives of human reproduction and of disability that are powered by 
globalizing technological and biomedical forces beyond their control. As they attempt to locate 
themselves and their children in these shifting moral terrains, subjunctive pasts and futures 
continue to emerge. 
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